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Rights are widely claimed and contested in the contemporary world. The 
prominence of rights in politics spurs debates about the sources of this 
prominence. 
There are two main accounts of the political prevalence of rights and 
of claims about them. For one account, the spread of rights is due to 
forces that are external to many if not most of the countries in which this 
process has been occurring. In one version Gi this view the driving force 
has been a political and cultural effort by Western countries to spread 
their conceptions of rights. In another version, the United States bears 
primary responsibility for the massive growth of rights claims in the last 
half century. 
The other main account of the growth of rights focuses on dynamics 
, within countries where this has occurred. Sometimes this internal 
dynamic is viewed as a process of modernization, as legal and political 
systems gain greater autonomy and complexity. Other views emphasize 
democratization as the key source of expanding rights claims and polit- 
ical discourses about rights. 
In my view the growth of rights derives mainly from democratizati~n.~ 
1. This article is based oiia talk given at "Rights - Civil, Human, and Natural," a P11.D. Seminar of the Con- 
sortium for American Studies held at the Center for American Studies at the University of Southern Denmark 
in Odense, in October 1999. In that ac3demic year I was Fulbright Chair at SINAS (Swedish Institute for 
North American Studies) at Uppsala University in Sweden. Thanks to Helle Porsdain for her comments. 
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My aim here is to show why and how democracy and democratization 
lead toward an expansion of rights and rights claims. These processes 
yield a politics of rights that is often tough and demanding, as with argu- 
ments about affirmative action, abortion, and education in the United 
States. 
I have no interest in denying that other views of these difficult ques- 
tions have merit. There are plausible reasons to consider the growth of 
rights as a process of Americanization. It stands out brightly in the 
United States, a country where lawyers and the law have always had a 
large political role. Many stories can be told to illustrate the American- 
izing side of the spread of rights. A member of the Swedish Parliament 
reported to me that in his partly rural district people were appearing 
before the courts full of complaints about the unfairness of the system. 
They were demanding rights and specific procedures, baffling lawyers 
and judges who did not understand their claims. It turned out that these 
Swedish citizens had developed a strong sense of appropriate legal rights 
and procedures from watching American legal dramas on television. 
They often had more contact with these shows than with the actual 
Swedish judicial system. They came to court expecting their imagined 
rights to be recognized in particular ways, even when those practices do 
not exist in those forms in Sweden. 
Yet to attribute the growth of rights mainly to the spread of American 
political and cultural influence risks turning a partial truth into a misun- 
derstanding of what democracy now means. Rights claims and political 
arguments about them have arisen widely in the last few decades, 
including in countries such as South Africa and India where direct Amer- 
ican influence has not been decisive. Moreover, for many decades during 
the Cold War the United States was willing to temper its interest in rights 
if that seemed prudent as regards sustaining anti-Soviet alliances. 
What about broadening the explanatory claim to include not just the 
United States but "the West" as the source of the contemporary upsurge - 
in rights? Democratic countries clearly do offer incentives and sanctions 
to encourage the spread of political practices for whch rights are central. 
2. In a very large literature, these books are especially relevant for my argument: Ronald Dworkin, Taking 
Rights Seriously; Mary Ann Glendon, Rights Talk: Tlze Iinpoverislzment of Political Discourse; Charles R. 
Epp, The Rights Revolution: Lawyers, Activists, and Supreme Courts in Comparative Perspective; and Jeremy 
Waldron, editor, Theories of Rights. 
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Yet if "the West" is sponsoring an international effort to install regimes of 
rights, why does this effort show uneven results? A serious effort to 
explain why American and Western pressures sometimes pay off and 
other times make little difference would have to consider the internal lea- 
tures of various countries' politics. So there is probably more room for 
theoretical agreement than one would imagine from the most heated 
polemics on these matters. 
In this article, however, I am not aiming to develop a synthesis. I want 
to explore relations between democracy and rights. My claim is that 
democratization and democracy powerfully encourage the growth of 
rights, including the emergence of a distinctive politics of rights. From a 
democratic perspective, the growth of rights and rights claims is on bal- 
ance highly positive. Significant problems result, but the latter are hard to 
avoid if one wants to sustain democratic practices. I start with these ques- 
tions: What is a right? Where does the expansion of rights come from his- 
torically? 
What is a right? 
A right is a prohibition against interference. If I have a right to [x] then no 
one (including the government) can stop me from doing or having [x]. 
This sense of what it means to have a right is important but not suffi- 
cient. Here is a fuller conception: To have a right is to be authorized to 
engage in a political or social activity. Thus to say that [x] is a central 
democratic right fuses two claims. The first is that democracy requires 
that individuals be authorized to engage in [XI. The second is that indi- 
viduals must be able to do (or have) [x] in order to engage in democratic 
politics. 
In institutional terms, we could say that political rights are authorized 
forms of action that cannot be prevented through regular political pro- 
cesses. This is too broad, as other features of politics are similarly pro- 
tected. Yet rights have properties that make phrases like "basic rights" or 
"fundamental rights" seem almost redundant. Individuals' rights enable 
them to act and to male choices about politics. 
For tl~ose who believe in a strong doctrine of natural rights, political 
regimes can be assessed in terms of their practical capacity to recognize 
preexisting rights as real. For others - and thus for actual polities com- 
posed of people with varied views of rights - rights are developed via 
basic agreements about the shape of a decent politics. In this sense rights 
are like constitutions, treaties, or even contracts - such agreements have 
force as part of a network of political and social relations. Thus rights can 
not be declared unilaterally, and they are not reducible to the paper on 
which they are written. Proponents of thoroughly rationalistic concep- 
tions of social relations have the same problem with rights that they are 
apt to have with constitutions, treaties, and contracts - why would oppor- 
tunism not immediately defeat any such agreements? This famously dif- 
ficult question can be answered, but not in this article. Here I will simply 
assert that agreements among social agents are possible, and that rights 
are a distinctive sort of agreement about the terms of action. They are a 
practical response to this proposal: "Let us arrange political and social 
relations so that individuals are authorized to engage in a specified set of 
actions without interference." 
Where does the expansion of rights come from? 
The origins and meanings of rights are contested - do they come from 
nature, God, tradition, or reflection? Political arrangements have to take 
account of these disagreements. We have to figure out how people who 
define and understand rights differently can agree to recognize a partic- 
ular set of rights. 
As a social and historical matter there is no single origin of rights. This 
diversity may be partly responsible for the fluid and durable character of . 
the concept. Socially, rights claims arose from popular movements as 
well as from more privileged groups whose members regarded them- 
selves as unfairly excluded from political~ower and subject to its arbi- 
trary exercise. Both sources were certainly important in the seventeenth 
and later centuries, and in this sense rights were a means of constraining 
power that was otherwise unaccountable. Rights claims also originated 
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from minorities who wished to be protected from the possible redistribu- 
tive projects of democratic majorities. - I 
In political terms, from the 17" to theearly 20'" century in Europe and 
North America rights were mainly a project of a secular and rationalist 
left. They were opposed in the name of liberties (Burke) or tradition 
(French and German conservatism). Critics charged that rights were 
abstract and formal. The implication was not that rights were therefore 
meaningless, but that they would corrode and disrupt valuable commit- 
ments and traditions. 
In the second half of the twentieth century the expansion of rights had 
a number of sources. Rights have been a central concern for the United 
Nations and (new) international law, as in Article 1 of the 1948 Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights: "All human beings are born free and equal 
in dignity and rights. They are endowed with reason and conscience and 
should act towards one another in a spirit of brotherhood." 
American power has been another source of rights claims, though not 
always directly. Over the twentieth century there was a deep shift in 
American (and international) thinking about the legitimacy of states. 
Legitimacy and sovereignty were once tightly linked, insofar as states 
capable of ruling were thereby deemed legitimate. Now legitimacy 
almost requires that a government show decent respect for civil and even 
political rights. 
In the last quarter of the twentieth century an unprecedented number of 
countries underwent transitions to some form of democracy. In almost all 
cases, these transitions included the enactment of constitutions in which 
rights had a prominent role in defining the new regime. 
The collapse of the Soviet Union and its allies has been another major 
\ source of the expansion of rights. Proponents of the Soviet project had 
made a positive argument alongside their critiques of the hollowness of 
rights in liberal democracies. They argued that durable democratic forms 
could arise from a substantive and nonformal conception and practice of 
governance. Thus in constitutions of the Soviet type the leading role of 
the Communist Party in political and social life was spelled out, and that 
role clearly dominated whatever rights appeared in the constitution. The 
leading party claimed legitimacy on grounds of the value of its substan- 
tive commitments and its capacity to realize them. 
This conception could produce (some) economic growth and (limited) 
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social welfare. But no Soviet-type regime ever produced a reasonably 
democratic polity. This result' showed the grave difficulty if not impossi- 
bility of producing democracy without a strong core of recognized rights. 
It puts a great burden of proof on communitarians, religious fundamen- 
talists, and others who claim that their substantive views rightly under- 
stood can sustain democracy without any very large reliance on rights. 
How do rights and rights claim increase? 
This sketch of the historical and contemporary sources of rights under- 
lines the variety of such sources. No single factor produced the great 
expansion of rights of the last half-century. This diversity is probably 
another source of the strong presence of rights and rights claims in con- 
temporary  politic^.^ I believe that a full inquiry into relations among 
these factors would result in attributing a major causal role to democracy 
and democratization in expanding rights. Here my aim is to show how 
this causal process works by analyzing how democracy contributes to the 
expansion of rights. I male three distinct claims. One is that processes of 
democratization create and expand rights. The second claim is that efforts 
to sustain and develop democratic practices increase rights. The third 
claim is that democracy increases complexity in political and social life, 
which in turn increases rights. 
By democracy I mean a political form in which equal citizens choose 
their government in open elections. By democratization I mean the estab- 
lishment of at least minimally democratic political procedures. By sus- 
taining democracy I mean securing and developing democratic practices, 
as well as expanding the range of application of democratic principles 
3. The variety and density of these sources of rights helps to explain why efforts to theorize democratic 
politics without much reference to rights have little practical effect in displacing rights and rights claims from 
political life. If definitions and understandings of rights are often tangled and sometimes appear to add little of 
value to political arguments, these problems will not cause the concept to disappear. Even if critics can pro- 
duce a clearer and richer way to talk about people's basic capacities to undertake political and social action - 
and this has not occurred - concepts as deeply based in political experience and understanding as the concept 
of rights have to be replaced rather than rejected. 
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and norms. Sustaining democracy can occur along several dimensions. It 
can increase the number of citizens who are eligible to participate in 
choosing the government. It can expand the areas within sociely that are 
reached by a democratic polity. The process of sustaining democracy has 
a large normative dimension as regards democratic practices and com- 
mitments. The horizon is a condition in which democracy is the pre- 
sumed mode of organizing social relations unless other modes are clearly 
required (as on functional grounds, as in a hospital) or strongly preferred 
by participants (as in a religious organization). 
Democratization increases rights 
Rights expand as a result of moving from undemocratic to democratic 
forms of governance. This is especially clear in the case of an overall 
national change of regime. 
From above, impulses to formalize rights arise as means of protecting 
positions that were enjoyed in undemocratic contexts. Elites fear that 
these positions will simply be taken away. Thus rights claims -often con- 
cerning property - are partly about protecting privileges when customary 
justifications and sheer force cannot do so. 
From below, strong pressures act to expand the most democratic ele- 
ments of the old regime. Thus African Americans in the United States 
demanded voting rights in the 1960s. They won the right to vote and 
opened new arguments about rights and fair representation. 
Strong pressures from below also favor recognizing new rights. Thus 
new social and economic rights frequently appear in the constitutions of 
new democracies - they are meant partly to enhance the legitimacy of 
these regimes and mark them off sharply from their undemocratic prede- 
cessors. 
The uncertainty that accompanies deep change also causes rights to 
expand. When democratization occurs it disrupts old arrangements and 
opens new possibilities. In this context many will regard rights as crucial 
for security, against familiar old forms of domination and potentially 
dangerous new majorities. 
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In sum, strong and varied forces encourage an elaboration of. prior 
rights and a development of new ones in the course of democratization. 
Sustaining democracy and rights 
In recent decades rights have notably expanded in more established 
democracies as well as in polities where democracy has recently been 
built. This is familiar territory for communitarian and conservative critics 
of American politics, who regard rights claims as an often-negative force 
that encourages selfish individualism, undermines communal ties, and 
hampers efficiency. 
Yet the American rights explosion is not unique. When efforts are 
made to develop and expand democracy, additional rights claims emerge. 
What gives this dynamic force in the U.S., Western Europe, and else- 
where? 
For the newest democracies, the opening of a democratic politics 
spawns arguments about rights as a key dynamic of political competition. 
After the first democratic election, the losers (as a new opposition) want 
to ensure that there will be another one in which they can compete seri- 
ously. Thus democratic competition, focused on succession, drives an 
expansion of rights claims. 
Both for newer and for older democracies, the entry of previously 
excluded or marginal groups also plays a large role in expanding rights. 
New entrants urge that conditions be created to prevent any recurrence of 
their prior exclusion. 
The expansion 01 democratic practices beyond choosing the govern- 
ment creates further pressures for rights to grow. As democratic forums 
multiply and potential participants increase, new claims can be made 
about what democratic politics requires. Many of these claims will 
invoke rights - to make a rights claim in these contexts is to say that I 
iequire [x] to participate fairly in democratic politics as a free or equal 
citizen or that if [y] happens I will not be able to participate fairly (or at 
all). 
Finally, in democratic settings social change opens the possibility of 
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new political arguments with respect to the meaning of the changes that 
are underway. It has become routine for claims to be made about a right 
with respect to some new activity whose basic features were not even 
known fifteen or twenty years before, as with technical change and envi- 
ronmental problems. 
Complexity and rights 
Democracy means more voices, more decisions, and more conflicts. It 
means more places where rights claims can be made. Thus democracy 
increases complexity. By complexity I mean: a large and increasing 
diversity of agents; impersonal political ties that cannot be sustained by 
direct relations of trust; and conflicting aims. Complexity grows along 
with and in response to democratization. Thus calls to reduce complexity 
in favor of directness and community imply a narrowing or decrease of 
democratic practices, though this is not usually intended. 
Democracy causes both rights and complexity to increase. It is thereby 
responsible for the ensuing dynamic between expanding rights and 
growing complexity. As critics of rights note, the expansion of rights 
causes political and social interaction to become more complex. Under 
democratic conditions, growing complexity also creates pressures to 
expand rights. As democracy widens people can not plausibly regard 
most citizens as brothers and sisters in a practical sense. Among citizens 
who are mainly strangers, rights ensure one's capacity to act politically. 
Thus rights are means of coping with the uncertainties that result from 
the complexity generated by democratization. 
Complexity strengthens rights claims in another way. To have rights 
means being able to assert the legitimacy of other spheres of life against 
politics, even the most democratic politics. A right to religious choice 
means that reasons of state cannot determine the shape or extent of 
people's religious activity. To recognize rights means rejecting the idea of 
a common evaluation of the appropriate role of political activity in a 
decent life. That is why rights make neo-republicans anxious, and why 
some of them try to show that a decent republican regime could secure 
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the benefits of rights without anyone having to assert them very vigor- 
ously. 
In sum, democratic projects cause rights claims to increase. They also 
generate increased complexity, which adds further pressures toward the 
expansion of rights. The dynamics I have outlined would be effective 
even in a relatively homogeneous society. Thus it is predictable that very 
strong pressures toward rights claims will normally arise amid the great 
diversity that is actually present in most contemporary polities. Given 
varied group and cultural attachments, deep political understanding can 
be very hard to attain, while many people belong to actual or potential 
4 
minorities. These elements will intensify perceived needs for the protec- 
tions that rights can at least partially offer. 
The American version of rights politics 
In the United States major features of our constitution and politics 
amplify the broad democratic tendency for rights to expand. 
First, the Constitution is brief to the point of being austere. In practice 
it is very hard to amend. The brevity of the Constitution guarantees that 
there will be an extended politics of interpretation, as brief and general 
statements have to be applied to new circumstances. 
It is almost impossible to change the Constitution on major issues (this 
was shown, for example, by the failure to pass the Equal Rights Amend- 
ment). The difficulty of changing the Constitution (due to its very 
demanding amendment requirements) encourages fights about rights. 
The result is a dense constitutional politics in which it is hard to distin- 
guish between important national policies and what might be called non- 
constitutional basic rights. 
Rights not named in the Constitution are defined and sustained through 
arguments about interpretation. The resulting political battles may seem 
to go on indefinitely. This is partly due to the depth of disagreements. It 
also registers the strategic situation of opponents of a newly established 
right. Because the Constitution was not changed to install that right, it is 
not necessary to amend the Constitution to limit or even revoke it. In this 
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context the lines between constitutional politics and policy fights are 
blurred and normal politics is drenched in arguments about rights. 
A politics of rights is encouraged by a unified legal system, as no con- 
stitutional court is clearly separated from other courts. In the American 
legal setting constitutional issues can in principle always be raised. Of 
course they aren't always raised. But everyone knows that the possibility 
of doing so exists. This puts rights questions and constitutional politics in 
the room during much routine judicial and legal activity. It also puts 
rights questions directly in the legislative process at all levels, as legisla- 
tors know that their legislation can readily be challenged and may well be 
invalidated. 
Third, weak parties and a presidential system encourage movements 
and interest groups to address the courts. When such movements are fre- 
quent and large, a politics of rights is apt to expand even more vigorously. 
The reason for this dynamic is straightforward. Movements that seek 
to gain political, social, and even cultural change will not find it easy to 
gain these changes via weak parties. As most such movements begin as 
minority movements, they usually face an executive that is primarily 
responsive to a different and often unfriendly majority. 
In democratic polities the main alternative to courts is parliamentary 
politics. While American movements do enter the main parties, the obsta- 
cles to gaining results through that route are evident enough to keep legal 
options alive and attractive. Thus idea that a movement's appeal to the 
courts subtracts from an authentic and autonomous movement politics is 
misleading. 
Finally, law is a compelling theme in American popular culture. This 
popularity partly registers the major historical role of the law and lawyers 
, in American politics. As many have noted, legal conflicts can readily be 
expressed in the familiar forms of a dynamic and open popular culture. In 
this context, competing media forces stand to gain from making legal 
forms and language more accessible (as well as more lively and dra- 
matic). On balance the results are democratic; whether this process 
involves degradation as well as popularization is debatable. 
Popular culture's focus on the law is likely to have the indirect effect of 
expanding a politics of rights. The publicity afforded to legally based 
rights claims will make such claims appear even more widely as plausibly 
effective means of addressing serious problems. And the familiarity with 
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legal forms and procedures that results from their widespread presence in 
popular culture makes legal action seem less exotic and more feasible. 
Taken together, the difficulty of amending the Constitution, a unified 
legal system, a presidential system with weak parties, and an energetic 
legally minded popular culture encourage a vigorous politics of rights in 
the United States. This country is not unique. Many countries have two or 
more of the features I have mentioned. Yet if democracy spawns rights 
claiins everywhere, the force of this tendency in the United States is 
notable. 
A politics of rights 
Rights and rights claims flow from democratization. They also derive 
from the ways that democracy increases complexity. Thus efforts to 
diminish complexity and to reduce rights claiins will usually have a neg- 
ative impact on democracy. Instead we should recognize the durable 
presence of a politics of rights. In the United States and elsewhere rights 
are contested. People argue about what counts as a right and how much it 
counts with respect to other rights. In a democratic context claims about 
rights do not end conversations or stop politics so much as they shift the 
debate from questions about who benefits to arguments about who can 
legitimately do what. 
The expansion of rights means that politics often appears as a two- 
level conflict. It is about practical choices and about the proper bases for 
making those choices. Moreover there is always debate about which level 
we should be on. Thus rights claims do not diminish or derogate politics 
so much as they expand and complicate political life.4 
As with other forms of politics, a politics of rights contains difficulties 
4. The durable presence of this two-level politics, yields political forms different from those often expected 
by advocates and critics of rights. Many proponents and critics of rights converge in viewing the relation 
between political engagement and commitments to rights in hydraulic terms, so that a flow in one direction 
reduces the amount of activity and energy in the other sphere. They of course differ on whether shifting 
toward rights is a good or a bad thing. Critics charge that rights simply undermine and reduce politics by for- 
eclosing debate on important matters. Advocates expect that rights claims, when recognized, will remove 
basic questions from political argument. Both views fail to recognize the degree to which political argument 
and conflict about relations among rights and about relations between rights and policies are sure to continue. 
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and hazards. One problem arises from tendencies toward a strategic 
expansion or even invention of rights claims. Those who expect to ben- 
efit may try to turn preferences and policies into rights in a purely instru- 
mental way. Many political forces have an interest in seeking to do this. 
If [x] is my preference and it can be construed as a condition that is 
required for me to engage in democratic politics, then [x] must be imple- 
mented. Charges of tyranny then erupt when one group believes that 
another group's policy preferences have been imposed as rights. 
In the United States answers to this problem are far easier to state than 
to attain. We might change normal politics to feature a more rapid pro- 
cessing of issues and clearer decisions. These changes might improve the 
quality of political life and attract more participation. The result might be 
to diminish the value of purely instrumental efforts to move questions 
onto a legal and constitutional terrain, because moves of this type might 
meet skepticism or even disdain. 
Another answer - even harder to imagine - would be to make constitu- 
tional change easier. Because constitutional change is so difficult to 
achieve, it is hard to claim that the failure to make a proposal part of the 
Constitution proves that it does not concern an important right. If consti- 
tutional change were less demanding, then the outcome of a serious 
amendment effort could reasonably be taken to decide whether a right 
should be recognized. 
A more transparent and engaging normal politics and less daunting 
amendment procedures might diminish tendencies to turn preferences 
into rights claims in purely opportunistic ways. Even then such tenden- 
cies would not disappear. The main remedy, in present or much improved 
conditions, is increased public awareness of this prospect. Such aware- 
ness would reduce the prospects of political forces whose proposals 
clearly make a game of claiming rights. This requires, of course, yet more 
public debate about rights. 
Rights inflation 
Another problem with a politics of rights is rights inflation. The South 
African Constitution (of 1996) includes this passage: 
American Studies in Scandinavia, Vol. 32, 2000 
Everyone bas the right to have access to adequate housing. 
The state must take reasonable legislative and other measures, 
within its available resources, to achieve the progressive reali- 
sation of this right. 
No one may be evicted from their home, or have their home 
demolished, without an order of court made after considering 
all the relevant circumstances. No legislation may permit arbi- 
trary evictions. 
This formulation of a social right is careful. It signals that while decent 
housing may be a right, South Africans should not expect it soon. To for- 
mulate such commitments as rights is an attractive route in countries 
where the legitimacy of new democratic institutions is uncertain. At 
times a constitution without such commitments would not appear to refer 
to a meaningful democracy. 
Yet the danger of inflation is significant. If one has a right to housing 
and no house, nor any reasonable prospect of a house in the near future, 
what should one do? If rights cannot be claimed now, what sort of consti- 
tution is this? Such failures can encourage populist upsurges aimed 
against a constitution devalued as hollow and formalistic. 
To define the possible results of successful policies (adequate housing 
for all) as rights can male it hard to distinguish between rights as real 
capaqities and rights as hopes for a better future. Some will be tempted to 
urge trading off the first kind of rights (thus limiting capacities) to 
enhance the chances of progress on the second (thereby expanding 
housing or jobs). This can be justified on grounds that no right is absolute 
and tradeoffs have to be made. 
In response to the dangers of rights inflation, the constitution can be 
divided between core and secondary rights. This can be a decent way to 
organize a new democracy if everyone understands what is going on.5 
5. Americans who rely on this country's experience to preach the virtues of brief procedural conslitutions 
may have relatively little to contribute in this area. The error is to think that in the United States we recoguize 
only the procedures and political rights in the Constitution. In fact our constitution is now inuch thicker than 
the one created in the eighteenth century plus amendments. Centuries of interpretation and legislation have 
created a far more extensive set of constitntional coinmitinents than a literal reading of the original document 
would suggest. . . 
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Rights in conflict 
A third problem concerns adjudicating among recognized rights. As 
rights expand, how should we sort out and order them? Even a small 
number of rights can not be arranged as an unambiguous list or schedule. 
When rights grow so does the need to order them. How should the con- 
flicts among all these rights be settled? My earlier definition only sug- 
gests a framework for a response: if rights are required for agents to 
engage in an activity (in this case democratic politics), we can order them 
in terms of our understanding of what that activity requires. 
In a politics of rights basic positions will be defined in terms of how 
people rank and relate different rights. Most people emphasize the pri- 
macy of one or another cluster of rights. One familiar way to identify 
groups of rights is based on their most direct referents. Thus it is common 
to distinguish among (1) political and civic rights, (2) property rights, and 
(3) social rights. Much conflict in the United States occurs among groups 
of people whose main ranltings of rights are [I, 2, 31, 12, 1, 31, and [I ,  3, 
21. Thus even to describe the positions of moderate liberals, conserva- 
tives, and left-liberals means specifying their views of how rights should 
be ordered. 
In contemporary democracies conflicts among rights are unavoidable. 
They are a core part of a politics of rights. Yet there are bound to be prob- 
lems. Conflicts about the priority of different rights can become abstract 
proxies for conflicts over very specific policies. As the terms of debate 
become more general and abstract, bases for practical compromise 
diminish. The resulting rigidity makes political settlements harder to 
, achieve. No means exist, at least so far, for causing this problem to disap- 
pear rather than managing it in a more or less democratic way. Its pres- 
ence is linked both to the protections supplied by rights and to the ways 
that rights allow contending parties to exit from fierce immediate con- 
flicts of interest and commitment that cannot be resolved. 
Given these difficulties and tensions, it is not surprising that the poli- 
tics of rights normally includes a critique of rights. In the twentieth cen- 
tury several critiques were made. Most of the critiques made with demo- 
cratic aims have gone astray in considering complexity and democracy as 
alternatives. 
The radical democratic notion is that rights diminish politics as self- 
governance. But transparent and direct self-governance in the sense that 
radical democrats often propose is not plausible. Absent rights we are apt 
to get less political argument in our conflicts. The choice is very often 
between appeals to rights and threats of force as a way of settling deep 
conflicts, given great diversity and deep differences. 
The populist notion is that rights empower judges and lawyers instead 
of the people. Rights do prevent leaders from acting however they wish 
on behalf of an allegedly unified people. Yet to enhance democracy we 
should mainly aim to democratize legal forms and practices, rather than 
seeking to reduce the role of law. 
The communitarian complaint is that rights undercut obligations. It is 
true that if people have rights they can resist demands made on them in 
the name of institutional and cultural conventions. They can insist that 
obligations be justified, which often means reformulating them as com- 
mitments. This may create an uncomfortable situation for people who 
prefer that certain things simply be done without much contention or 
( even reflection. I doubt that democrats should regret the rise of argu- 
ments about commitments in place of a less reflective performance of 
obligations. 
Democracy, complexity, rights 
Few political actors set out primarily to expand the set of recognized 
rights or to turn normal political contests into battles about adjudication 
and constitutional interpretation. Yet rights continue to expand, along 
with battles about them. 
The main dynamic that drives the expansion of rights arises from 
within polities: efforts to establish and sustain democracy are the primary 
cause of the growth of rights and rights claims. Democracy increases 
rights. Democracy also increases complexity, which in turn encourages 
the expansion of rights. Within a framework defined by these powerful 
dynamics, Western pressures and American cultural influence strengthen 
the growth of rights. 
The resulting politics of rights combines constitutional, legal, and 
policy issues. We can not understand or engage this politics if we imagine 
that it can be greatly reduced (or even disappear) without also reducing 
the range and depth of democratic practices. The tight links among 
democracy, complexity, and rights may be discouraging for those who 
envision a simple, direct, and even communal politics. For other 
democrats these links pose a compelling challenge: how can a politics of 
rights be shaped in ways that make a positive contribution to sustaining 
democracy? This question points beyond the limits of the present article. 
It concerns vital theoretical and practical problems in all the varied coun- 
tries where efforts to develop and sustain democracy are under way. 
